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This paper points up the methodological inadequacy of the “student evaluation of 
teaching” as a research program. We do this by reference to three, interrelated 
arguments. The first is that the student evaluation of teaching cannot claim to 
capture the wisdom of a crowd because, as a research program, it fails to meet 
Surowiecki’s conditions for the existence and articulation of the wisdom of a 
crowd. The second argument extends the first, by stating: (a) the “student 
evaluation of teaching” research program fails to provide the methodological 
controls needed to differentiate cause from effect, or put differently (b) the 
methodological underpinnings of this research program is tantamount to the 
misapplication of a closed-system paradigm to an open social system. The third 
argument has two parts. These are that this research program is predicated on: (a) a 
false analogy between the workings of a business and a university, and therefore 
(b) on a mischaracterization of the student-professor relationship. These three 
arguments, these three failures, suggest that the “student evaluation of teaching” 
research program is methodologically ill-conceived and incoherent, and therefore 
cannot, with any credulity, serve as a guide to the administration and governance of 
a university.  
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Introduction 
Imre Lakatos (1978a and 1978b) argued that a scientific theory can be seen to be 
comprised of two parts: (a) a collection of “research programs” with a “hard core”, 
and (b) a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. He also argued that the latter is a 
shield designed by the proponents or advocates of the theory to defend the former 
from falsification. 
The objective of this paper is to penetrate the belt that protects the research 
program related to the student evaluation of teaching (SET), in the hope of 
silencing its proponents or advocates. In particular, this paper mounts a fresh and 
systematic attack on three methodological weaknesses inherent to the SET 
Research Program -- weaknesses that in the past its proponents or advocates have 
dismissed or ignored. The intent of this paper is to deny them the use of these two 
stratagems henceforth.  
In this effort, this paper presents three, interrelated arguments. The first argument 
uses as its starting point a recent book called The Wisdom of Crowds (2004). Its 
author, James Surowiecki, maintained that wisdom is dispersed throughout society, 
often very thinly. But where and when it can be articulated, this wisdom is usually 
more reliable than the wisdom of elites. In the first argument of this paper, we 
maintain that the SET Research Program: (a) fails to meet Surowiecki’s conditions 
for the existence and articulation of the wisdom of a crowd, and therefore  (b) the 
data captured in the SET are apt not to reflect the wisdom of a crowd, but its folly. 
And so we term this first argument, “The SET Research Program as pedagogical 
folly.” 
In a sense, the second argument extends the first. The second states that: (a) the 
SET Research Program fails to provide the methodological controls needed to 
differentiate cause from effect, or stated differently (b) the methodological 
underpinnings of the SET Research Program is the misapplication of a closed-
system paradigm to an open social system. We term this argument, “The SET 
Research Program as pseudoscience.” 
The third argument advances the claim that the SET Research Program is 
predicated on a false analogy between the nature and substance of the typical 
business and university, and therefore on a mischaracterization of the true nature of 
the student-professor relationship. Because of this, we term our third argument, 
“The SET Research Program as a logical fallacy.” 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents some 
preliminary statements about the origins, nature, and substance of the SET research 
agenda. Section 3 outlines the first argument, “The SET Research Program as 
pedagogical folly.” Section 4 outlines the second argument, “The SET Research 
Program as pseudoscience.” And Section 5 outlines the final argument, “The SET 
Research Program as a logical fallacy.” Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. Economic Interferences  AE 
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1. Some preliminary comments 
The history of the SET Research Program spans at least the past eight decades. One 
of the earliest uses of the SET was by the psychologist, E.T. Guthrie, at the 
University of Washington in the 1920s. By the late 1960s or early 1970s, the SET 
was widely adopted in most colleges and universities in North America. Its 
widespread adoption stemmed from the fact that it was supported by a coalition of 
three groups: (a) students who wanted a say in teaching,
1 (b) administrators who 
were concerned with accountability and good public relations, and (c) young 
faculty who wanted their salary, promotion and tenure evaluations to depend on 
something other than number of publications [Murray (2005, p. 1)]. 
The utility of the SET data is considered by most to depend on which of two 
functions the data are put. These two, “formative” and the “summative”, are due to 
Scriven (1967). The term, “formative”, applies when the SET data are used by an 
individual instructor to obtain student feedback on his or her “teaching 
effectiveness” [e.g., Adams (1997), Blunt (1991), and Rifkin (1995)]. The term, 
“summative”, applies when the SET data are used by an administrative committee 
(most often comprised of members of the aforementioned collation) in the 
determination of reappointment, pay, merit pay, tenure, and/or promotion of an 
individual instructor [e.g., Hills (1974), Rifkin (1995), and Grant (1998)]. In the 
paragraphs that follow, all references to the SET data and to its research program 
have the latter, the summative, function in mind. 
While the questionnaire used to collect the SET data varies from university to 
university, certain commonalities exist.  One summary of these commonalities is 
offered in Table 1 for the reader’s benefit.  
 
A characterization of the commonalities  




• The SET survey instrument is comprised of a series of questions about course 
content and teaching effectiveness. Some questions are open-ended, while others 
are closed-ended.  
• Those, which are closed-ended, often employ a scale to record a response. The 
range of possible values, or example, may run from a low of 1 for “poor,” to a 
high of 5 for “outstanding.”  
                                                 
1 Much of this demand arose out of the caldron of student unrest in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s [Frankel (1968), Bay (1988), Platt (1993), and Black (2001)]. AE  The student evaluation of teaching: Its failure  
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• In the closed-ended section of the SET survey instrument, one question is of 
central import to the “summative” function. It asks the student: “Overall, how 
would you rate this instructor as a teacher in this course?” In the main, this 
question plays a pivotal role on the evaluation process. For ease of reference, I 
term this question the “single-most-important question” (hereafter, the SMIQ).  
• In the open-ended section of the SET survey instrument, students are invited of 
offer short critiques of the course content and of the teaching effectiveness of the 
instructor.  
• The completion of the SET survey instrument comes with a guarantee to 
students; that is, the anonymity of individual respondents.  
• The SET survey instrument is administered: (i) by a representative of the 
university administration to those students of a given class who are present on 
the data-collection day, (ii) in the latter part of the semester, and (iii) in the 
absence of the instructor.  
• Upon completion of the survey, the analyst then takes the response to each 
question on each student’s questionnaire, and then constructs question-specific 
and class-specific measures of central tendency, and of dispersion – this in an 
attempt to determine if the performance of a given instructor in a particular class 
meets a cardinally- or ordinally- measured minimal level of “teaching 
effectiveness.”  
It seems that, in such analyses, raw SET data on the SMIQ are used in the main. 
More likely than not, this situation arises from the fact that the SET survey 
instrument does not provide for the collection of background data on the student 
respondent (such as major, GPA, program year, required course?, age, gender, ..), 
on course characteristics, etc. 
 
2. The SET Research Program as pedagogical folly 
 
A touchstone in Surowiecki’s book, The Wisdom of Crowds, is a paper by the 
English Victorian polymath, and a half-cousin of Charles Darwin, Sir Francis 
Galton (1822-1911). This paper, entitled “Vox populi”, was published in Nature in 
1907. It records Galton’s observations and analysis of a weight-judging contest at 
the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition.  
In this contest, a competitor viewed a live ox, and then paid a fee to submit a 
written estimate of the weight of the ox after it has been slaughtered and dressed. In 
this contest, a cash prize was awarded to the competitor whose estimate came 
closest to the dressed weight. About the contest, Galton observed and reported that 
the dressed weigh of the ox was 1198 pounds, and (from an analysis of the written Economic Interferences  AE 
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estimates) that the “midmost estimate” of the competitors was 1207 pounds. From 
these facts, Galton noted that “the vox populi was in this case 9 lbs., or 0.8 per 
cent. of the whole weight too high”, and he then concluded that,  “this result is … 
more creditable to the trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than might have 
been expected.”  
In his recent review of Surowiecki’s book, Roger Kerr (2004) observed that, 
“Galton had stumbled on what Surowiecki calls a ‘simple but powerful truth” … 
that “under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are 
often smarter than the smartest people in them” … that “when our imperfect 
judgments are aggregated in the right way, our collective intelligence is often 
excellent’” .. and that “the wisdom of a crowd doesn’t depend on any member of 
the crowd being wise; indeed, every member of the crowd could be hopelessly 
foolish. But in a crowd the mistakes are likely to run in all directions and cancel 
one another out, leaving a sound judgment in the aggregate” (p. 2).
 2  Kerr (2004) 
cautions that, “crowd wisdom is not infallible”, and notes that “Surowiecki devotes 
much of his book to showing how the absence of any of his .. conditions diminish 
it” (p. 5).  
What then are the preconditions to which Kerr refers? What are Surowiecki’s 
preconditions that separate the wisdom from the folly of crowds? There are four, 
and these are as follows:  
• Diversity of opinion: Each person should have private information even if it’s 
just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts.  
• Independence: People’s opinions aren’t determined by the opinions of those 
around them.  
• Decentralization: People are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge.  
• Aggregation: Some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a 
collective decision. 
 
                                                 
2 A parallel source of inspiration in Surowiecki’s book is the work of the Austrian 
economist, Frederick von Hayek. According to Hayek (1937, 1945, and 1975), there is a 
division of knowledge within society. As the noted Hayekian scholar and biographer 
observed, ”Actually-existing knowledge is dispersed; different individuals have access to 
different bits of it. Their actions are based on their varying subjective beliefs, beliefs that 
include assumptions about future states of the world and about other people’s beliefs and 
actions. The ‘central question of all social science’ ..  is how such dispersed knowledge 
might be put to use, how society might coordinate the knowledge that exists in many 
different minds and places” [Caldwell (1997), p. 1865)]. Clearly, in Caldwell’s comment, 
one can hear echoes of Galton (1907) and Surowiecki (2004). AE  The student evaluation of teaching: Its failure  
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For purposes of the present discussion, we synthesize these four conditions into 
two criteria. And these two will serve as our device to test the viability of any 
claim that the SET data contain what-may-be-termed Galton’s “Vox Populi”. 
These two criteria are:  
• Criterion 1 - Verifiability: Galton’s argument about a crowd’s wisdom is hinged 
on the proximity or nearness of  the crowd’s estimate of the weight of the dressed 
ox to a verifiable, objective measurement of ox’s weight.  Put differently, a 
verifiable, objective measurement is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for Galton’s argument about the wisdom of a crowd to persuade. 
• Criterion 2 - Unbiasedness: The second criterion requires that (in the aggregate) 
overestimates of the ox’s weight cancel out all underestimates. Stated differently, 
(a) the average of all of the participants’ estimates must represent an unbiased 
estimate of true weight of the ox, or (b) the aggregate estimate of the ox’s weight 
must be unbiased estimate of the ox’s actual weight. This unbiasedness criterion 
is (as before) a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for Galton’s argument 
about the wisdom of a crowd to persuade. 
Next, it is instructive to ask, how does Galton’s ox-weighing contest relate to the 
SET Research Program? The answer to this question has two parts: (a) Common to 
both Galton’s contest and in the SET Research Program is an analyst who solicits 
the wisdom of the crowd by asking its individual members to estimate a property of 
an object of analysis. In Galton’s case, the object is an ox, and the property of 
interest is the ox’s dressed weight. In the SET Research Program, the object is an 
instructor, and the property of interest is the instructor’s “quality of teaching”. (b) 
But beyond this point, the comparison of the Galton’s contest and the SET 
Research Program breaks down. How? The SET Research Program fails to satisfy 
Criteria 1 and 2, as the following review of the research literature on the SET 
makes this clear. In particular,  
 
2.1. The failure of the SET Research Program to satisfy Criterion 1 
 
The SET Research Program fails Criterion 1 in that while the dressed weight of an 
ox can be verified, the “quality of teaching” of an instructor cannot. Three 
comments about this present claim are warranted. 
Remark 1: At the core of this section (indeed, at the core of this paper) is the 
following logic: (a) “Good teaching” or “teaching quality” cannot be defined  [e.g., 
Sproule (2000 and 2002), and Trout (2000)].  (b) What cannot be defined cannot 
measured [e.g., Weissberg (1993, p. 8)]. (c) What cannot be measured cannot be 
verified for accuracy. And (d) what cannot be verified for accuracy cannot pass 
(nor fail) the “wisdom of a crowd” test.  
Remark 2: Our claim that “good teaching” or “teaching quality” cannot be defined, 
and therefore cannot be measured, is echoed elsewhere. For example, in his survey Economic Interferences  AE 
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of the SET, Cashin (1995) wrote, “In educational measurement, the basic question 
concerning validity is: does the test measure what it is supposed to measure? For 
student ratings, this translates into: To what extent do student rating items measure 
some aspect of teaching effectiveness or teaching quality? Unfortunately there is 
no agreed upon definition of ‘effective teaching’, nor any single, all-embracing 
criterion. The best one can do is to try various approaches, collecting data that 
either support or contest the conclusion that student ratings reflect effective 
teaching.” Likewise, Olivares (2003) noted that, “.. teacher performance is a 
dynamic criterion predicated on an ill-defined notion of teacher effectiveness. 
Attempts to measure and draw conclusions regarding teacher effectiveness, without 
a more complete explication of  ‘teacher effectiveness’ is bound to result in 
continued controversy ..” (p. 237). In summary, Harvey and Green (1993) 
contended that “teaching quality” is not a unitary concept and its meaning is 
“relative to the user of the term and the circumstances in which it is invoked” (p. 
10).
3  
Remark 3:  Kerlinger (1973) noted, “The commonest definition of validity is 
epitomized by the question: Are we measuring what we think we are measuring? 
The emphasis in this question is on what is being measured” (p. 457). So to say that 
“good teaching” or “teaching quality” is not measurable and not verifiable is more 
damaging than answering in the negative to Kerlinger’s question, “Are we 
measuring what we think we are measuring?”. Likewise, to say that “good 
teaching” or “teaching quality” is not measurable is to say that the SET Research 
Program lacks “criterion validity”, to use the 
jargon of  psychologists.
4 In summary, Olivares (2003) noted that, advocates for 
the SET “.. have created a body of evidence that suggests student ratings are a valid 
measure of teacher effectiveness. Yet, this research rests upon a weak foundation; 
namely, the inadequate definition and operationalisation of teacher effectiveness. 
This weakness has compromised the integrity of validity evidence and inferences 
drawn therefrom” (p. 238). 
                                                 
3And it gets worse: In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig (1974) 
observed,  “I think there is such a thing as Quality, but that as soon as you try to define it, 
something goes haywire. You can’t do it.” (p. 184). [For reflections on Pirsig’s 
assessment of Quality, see Hoyer and Hoyer (2001), Rodino (1980), Shields (1999), and 
Willis (2000).] 
4 These claims are echoed in a dated paper on criterion-centered research by Astin (1964). 
He noted that, “(e)ven in higher education, there are no criteria for assessing teaching 
proficiency; a professor’s competence is usually measured in terms of the number of 
articles he has published” (pp. 808-09).  AE  The student evaluation of teaching: Its failure  
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If any fallback position from these criticisms exists, then surely it is merely an 
opening for the divining of the high priests of the SET Research Program, and for 
the mongering of pseudoscience.
5 
 
2.2. The failure of the SET Research Program to satisfy Criterion 2 
 
The SET Research Program fails Criterion 2 in that the average of students’ 
estimates is not an unbiased estimate of whatever-it-is-that-the-SET-data-actually-
measures. To buttress this statement, we present in Table 2 (below) a simplistic 
overview to Wachtel’s (1998) recent literature survey of the SET. In particular, this 
table presents four overarching types of  biases inherent in, or background 
variables thought to influence, the measurement of “good teaching” in the SET 
Research Program. These types of contaminating variables are: (a) the 
characteristics associated with the administration of student evaluations, (b) the 
characteristics of the instructor, (c) the characteristics of the students, and (b) the 
reactions of students and faculty to the use of the SET. Within each of the 
overarching types reported in Table 2, one finds a listing of specific examples of 





The core framework used in Howard Wachtel’s (1998)




The background variables thought to influence the SET include: 
 
• The characteristics associated with the administration of the SET: The timing of 
evaluation, the anonymity of student raters, the instructor presence in classroom, 
the stated purpose of the evaluation, the characteristics of the course (e.g., 
                                                 
5 We choose our words carefully: (a) Hubley and Zumbo (1996) provided a useful, current 
day overview to “validity” in Psychology, and Olivares (2003, pp. 234-36) outlined the 
role of three types of validity in the context of the SET [viz., criterion, content, and 
construct]. (b) While criterion validity is accessible to all including the informed 
layperson, the other two are not. These are the province of the “experts”, or the “high 
priests” of Psychology.  (c) So when a situation denies the use of criterion validity, the 
informed layperson becomes a captive of the “high priests”.  (d) Situations that separate 
the informed layperson from the “high priests” may have helped to prompt Richard 
Feynman (1986), Nobel laureate in physics, to characterize Psychology as a “Cargo Cult” 
pseudoscience [cited in Richters (1997, pp. 207-208)], and Paul Meehl (1978) to state 
that most “theories” in Psychology “.. suffer the fate that General MacArthur ascribed to 
old generals - They never die .. they just slowly fade away” [cited in Richters (1997, p. 
195)]. Economic Interferences  AE 
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electivity), the class meeting time, the level of course, the class size, the subject 
area, and the workload of the course.  
• The characteristics of the instructor: The instructor’s rank and experience, the 
reputation of instructor, the instructor’s research productivity, the personality of 
instructor, the seductiveness of instructor (the ‘Dr. Fox’ effect), the gender of 
instructor, the minority status of instructor, and the physical appearance of 
instructor.  
• The characteristics of the students: The personality characteristics, the prior 
subject interest, the gender of the student, the expected grade, the leniency 
hypothesis, the student’s expectations and emotional state, and the student’s age  
•  The reaction to the dissemination and use and the SET: The reaction by faculty, 




3. The SET Research Program as pseudoscience 
 
While the SET data are cursed by contaminating variables [Table 2], the advocates 
for the SET Research Program rarely make an effort to control for, or to even 
acknowledge the presence of, them [e.g., Sproule (2000 and (2002)] . And while 
controlling for these contaminating variables may not be a viable option in that the 
SET data are extracted from a non-experimental setting, so too is not 
acknowledging their presence. Academic honesty requires no more, and no less. 
Stated differently, academic honesty requires a clear admission that the analysis of 
the SET data is predicated on the application of a closed-system paradigm in the 
analysis of data from (what is in fact) an open social system.
6 
How does this directly relate to the SET Research Program? The first of two key 
ontological presumptions that advocates of the SET Research Program hold is that 
there exists a unique entity, termed “good teaching” or “teaching quality”, and that 
this can be defined and measured operationally. An argument against this assertion 
has been made already in Section 3. The second presumption is that if “good 
teaching” or “teaching quality” does exist (which it does not) and if it can be 
defined and can be measured (which it cannot), then there must also exist a 
monotonic and a time-space invariant relationship between  “teaching quality” 
                                                 
6 This specie of discussion appears in Psychology [e.g., Meehl (1990a and 1990b), Lykken 
(1991), and Richters (1997)], in Educational Psychology [e.g., Elsworth (1994), Kemp 
and Holmwood (2003), and Nash (2005)], and in Economics [e.g., Lawson (1989, 2001, 
and 2003), Dow (2002), and Chick and Dow (2005)]. Common to all of these (either 
implicitly or explicitly) are elements of several overarching frameworks: (a) the part-
whole dualism, (b) the mechanistic-organismic dualism [e.g., Wheeler (1935)], (c) 
methodological individualism-holism dualism vs. systematism [e.g., Bunge (2000a and 
2000b), and Denis (2003)], and (d) Critical Realism [e.g, Bhaskar (1989), Collier (1994), 
and Sayer (1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999)]. AE  The student evaluation of teaching: Its failure  
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itself, and the students’ reports of  it. In other words, the link between “teaching 
quality” and students’ reports of “teaching quality” is found in, and is defined by, 
what methodologists term a closed system.  
However, the gulf between claim and reality is unbridgeable. Rather than being 
provided by a setting that assures of time-space invariance and monotonicity, the 
analyst is confronted by a situation in which the data are contaminated by a “crud 
factor”, to use the phrase of the revered psychologist, Paul Meehl (1990a); that is, 
the analyst is confronted by a non-experimental setting in which “everything is 
correlated with everything else”. The next two remarks, it is hoped, will drive 
home the point about the importance and presence of Meehl’s “crud factor”. 
Remark 4: If the classroom setting does indeed provide for time-space invariance 
and monotonicity, then one ought to be able to expect that those characteristics of 
the instructor that are irrelevant to the pedagogical process will not impact 
students’ reports of “teaching quality” [e.g., Feldman (1977), and Olivares (2003, 
p. 238)]. But the research literature provides a different story, as Wachtel’s (1998) 
review points up. [See again Table 2 above.] In particular, the literature documents 
the existence of relationships between students’ reports of “teaching quality” and 
the instructor’s age [e.g., Goebel and Cashen  (1979)], the instructor’s gender 
[e.g., Goebel  and Cashen (1979), Buck and Tiene (1989), and Feldman (1993)], 
the instructor’s attractiveness or beauty [e.g., Goebel and Cashen (1979), Buck 
and Tiene (1989), and Hamermesh and Parker (2005)], the instructor’s demeanor 
or personality [e.g., Damron (1994)], the instructors’ charisma [e.g., Ambady and 
Rosenthal (1993)], and the instructor’s gestural mannerisms, better known as the 
“Dr. Fox Effect” [e.g., Ware and Williams (1975), Williams and Ware (1977), and 
Williams and Ceci (1977)]. 
Remark 5: Likewise, if the classroom setting does indeed provide for time-space 
invariance and monotonicity, then one ought to be able to expect that those 
characteristics of the student that are irrelevant (or even relevant) to the 
pedagogical process will not impact students’ reports of “teaching quality” [e.g., 
Feldman (1977), and Olivares (2003, p. 238)]. Again, the research literature 
provides a different story, as Wachtel’s (1998) review points up. [See once more 
Table 2 above.] In particular, the literature documents cases in which student 
ratings of “teaching quality” are impacted by a student’s personality and emotive 
state [e.g., Clayson and Sheffet (2006), Small et al. (1982), and Trout (2006)]. In 
addition,  the literature documents cases in which student ratings of “teaching 
quality” are impacted by a student’s grade or expected grade [e.g., Glenn (2007), 
Krautmann and Sander (1999), and Langbein (2005)]. In summary, Olivares (2003) 
noted that, “.. student ratings are not objective evaluations of teacher effectiveness 
but rather a reflection of the psychosocial needs, feelings and satisfaction of the 
raters” (p. 237). Economic Interferences  AE 
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It may prove instructive for some to spotlight the details of a few of the studies 
cited in Remarks 4 and 5 above: 
Remark 6: In the Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) study, non-student raters were 
exposed to six-second silent video clips of instructors, and their teaching-
evaluation scores were correlated with the scores recorded by students in a regular 
classroom setting. The researchers found that the two sets of scores were correlated 
positively and highly. They  wrote, “On the basis of observations of video clips just 
half a minute in length, complete strangers were able to predict quite accurately the 
ratings of teachers by students who had interacted with them over the course of a 
whole semester! Furthermore, these predictions retained their accuracy after we 
adjusted for physical appearance of the teachers, indicating that the judges were 
picking up very subtle nonverbal cues.” For us, this study begs two questions: (a) 
What information about “teaching effectiveness” or “teaching quality” is contained 
in the numerical evaluations by students at the end of the term that is not contained 
in the numerical evaluations by non-students after an exposure to a six-second 
silent video clip? (b) What information about “teaching effectiveness” or “teaching 
quality” is contained in the numerical evaluations by students at the end of the 
term? The findings of Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) would suggest that the 
answer to both questions is, “At best, not much.”  
Remark 7: As stated above,  Glenn (2007), Krautmann and Sander (1999), and 
Langbein. (2005), report that student ratings of “teaching quality” are impacted by 
a student’s grade or expected grade. In the case of Glenn, he wrote:  
“Student evaluations of instructors are deeply imperfect tools that are often 
misused by college administrators -- but the evaluations should not be scrapped, 
two scholars said here on Saturday at the annual meeting of the Association for 
Psychological Science. Each scholar sketched a model for reforming the faculty-
assessment system. 
“‘At best, student ratings provide a weak measure of instructional quality,’ said 
Anthony G. Greenwald, a professor of psychology at the University of 
Washington. ‘They’re heavily influenced by grades, and they’re also influenced by 
class size.’ 
“Mr. Greenwald presented an analysis of the student ratings of more than 14,000 
courses given at his university from 1997 to 2001. He was especially interested in 
exploring how average course ratings varied by department. Courses in 
Washington’s dance department, for example, typically received high student 
evaluations, while chemistry, physics, and mathematics courses tended to rate 
poorly. 
“Not surprisingly, Mr. Greenwald said, he found that 70 percent of the variance in 
departments’ average course-evaluation scores could be explained by differences 
in students’ grades. In departments where professors’ grading was more rigorous, 
students’ evaluation scores were lower. Like many other analysts of student AE  The student evaluation of teaching: Its failure  
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evaluations, Mr. Greenwald worries that, if evaluations are misused, they could 
give instructors perverse incentives to inflate their grades or dumb down their 
courses.” 
For us, one statement that greatly damages the position of those who advocate the 
use of the SET is Glenn’s statement that “Mr. Greenwald .. found that 70 percent of 
the variance in departments’ average course-evaluation scores could be explained 
by differences in students’ grades.”
7 Clearly, according to Greenwald, the variation 
in the SET data is swamped by the grade effect to the exclusion of all other effects, 
including the “teaching quality” effect, if indeed “teaching quality” could be 
measured. In a related vein, the econometric studies by Krautmann and Sander 
(1999), and by Langbein (2005), offer results that are consistent with the 
hypothesis that instructors can “buy” better evaluations through more lenient 
grading.
 8 
Remark 8: In a recent paper, Youmans and Jee (2007) outline experimentally 
another method by which better evaluations can be bought. They write “that 
something as trivial as offering chocolates” to students before an evaluation can 
affect the scores that students assign their teacher. 
In summary, in the analysis of an open social system, one cannot do the 
impossible: one cannot “unscramble an egg” [Sproule (2000)].
 9 And so, if the 
claims made by the advocates of the SET Research Program are not seen as bad 
                                                 
7 Greenwald’s related research includes Gillmore and Greenwald (1999), Greenwald 
(1997), and Greenwald and Gillmore (1997a, 1997b, and 1998). 
8 These findings can be combined with other arguments cited in this paper. For example, 
since “teaching quality” is not-observable, the players can “game the system”. That is, 
not only can faculty curry more favorable SET scores from students by engaging in grade 
inflation, but this same stratagem enables students to behave as “customers” of  (not as 
partners in) the educational process, and to participate passively (not actively)]. For 
more, see Fischer (2006).   
9 Here, echoes of Critical Realism can be heard. For example, Sayer (1992) explained that 
positivism is derived from a philosophy of atomism, which has two branches: “The 
ontological branch – concerning the theory of what exists – holds that the world consists 
of discrete, distinct atomistic elements existing at discrete, distinct points in time of 
space. Being atomistic these basic elements have no internal structure or differentiation 
and no causal powers. The various objects that we know are nothing but different 
combinations of these atoms. All relations between objects are external and contingent, 
so that all sequences are accidental. These assumptions are matched by the 
epistemological branch – concerning the theory of knowledge – which depicts 
observation as fragmented into simple, unproblematic, indivisàible ‘readings’. These two 
branches are mutually reinforcing: if objects or events are ‘punctiform’ their observation 
as such is also more plausible and vice versa” (p. 155). Likewise, Richter (1997, pp. 195-
97) made clear: (a) that the closed system paradigm presumes that the objects of analysis 
are like atoms [that is, homogenous and passive], but (b) that human organisms are unlike 
atoms in that they are heterogeneous and active. Economic Interferences  AE 
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science, then one must conclude: (a) that no research program can be, and (b) that 
everyone engaged in the analysis of the SET data is entitled to subscribe to the 
dictum of the scientific anarchist, Paul Feyerabend (1975), which is, “anything 
goes”. 
Next, we ask, can one enlist standards other than those invoked in the above to 
strengthen the present argument that the SET Research Program is bad science? 
Here, we say, “yes”, by turning to Stephen Toulmin’s (2003) Uses of Argument .
10 
And here, we ask, does the SET Research Program conform to Toulmin’s model of 
good argument and good science? To address this question, we begin by offering 
two pithy comments by Hansen and Eschelbach Hansen (2005) about Toulmin’s 
model of good argument and science. They wrote,   
“In his influential book the Uses of Argument (first published in 1958), the 
philosopher Stephen Toulmin argues that good arguments, regardless of what field 
they are made in, have common features. The common features are a claim, 
evidence, a warrant, and qualifications. The claim is the central statement of the 
argument. A claim is a statement that is disputable. If the claim was obviously true, 
there would be no need for argument. The evidence provides support for the claim. 
The warrant explains why the evidence should be persuasive. The qualifications are 
the limits of the argument: where it should apply and where it may not.” (p. 5) 
“Toulmin presents the claim and the evidence as the leading elements in the 
argument. He explains that ‘the explicit appeal in this argument goes directly from 
the claim to the data relied on as foundation: the warrant is, in a sense, incidental 
and explanatory’ (Toulmin 2003, 92). He goes on to state that ‘data are appealed to 
explicitly, warrants implicitly’ (Toulmin 2003, 92). The researcher, Toulmin 
argues, should make a claim, present the evidence in support of the claim, and then 
explain why that evidence is persuasive. The approach is lawyerly: present piece 
after piece of evidence and then in summation explain why the jury must be 
persuaded by the evidence.” (p. 5) 
A third, useful comment provided by Hansen and Eschelbach Hansen (2005) is 
that, and here we paraphrase: (a) the warrant comes in the form of a theory and a 
model, (b) the warrant is the horse, and the evidence the cart, and (c) rather than 
being implicit and following the data, the warrant is explicit and leads the search 
for evidence (p. 7). To summarize, the warrant is a general, hypothetical (and often 
implicit) logical statement that serves as the bridge between the claim and the data. 
Next, we ask, how can Toulmin’s definition of “good argument” and “good 
science” be used to assess the methodological viability of the SET Research 
Program? Our response is this: since the SET Research Program has no (formal) 
model, then (by definition) it can have no warrant, and hence it has no bridge 
                                                 
10 As evidenced by Footnotes 6 and 9, Critical Realism could be enlisted also.  
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between its claim(s) and its data. This assessment is borne out by our ongoing, 
lengthy, and detailed review of the SET literature: we have been unable to identify 
a single study that defines, or otherwise offers, a coherent model or theory. And so, 
we conclude that in their failure to meet the standards laid out by Toulmin, all 
arguments within the SET Research Program are incomplete, and therefore 
unpersuasive. 
Here, it should be noted that this absence of a model or theory, this absence of a 
warrant, within the SET Research Program is representative of a chronic problem 
within soft psychology. In this very connection, Lakatos (1978a) observed, 
“This requirement of continuous growth.., hits patched-up, unimaginative series of 
pedestrian ‘empirical’ adjustments which are so frequent, for instance, in modern 
social psychology. Such adjustments may, with the help of so-called ‘statistical 
techniques,’ make some ‘novel’ predictions and may even conjure up some 
irrelevant grains of truth in them. But this theorizing has no unifying idea, no 
heuristic power, no continuity. They do not add up to a genuine research 
programme and are, on the whole, worthless.” (p. 88)  
To summarize, in its attempt to apply a closed-system paradigm in its analysis of 
an open social system, and in its failure to offer a bridge between its claim(s) and 
the data, the SET Research Program must be viewed as a failure, and as 
pseudoscience. As the widely-respected astronomer, Carl Sagan (1997), once 
noted,  
“Pseudoscience is embraced, it might be argued, in exact proportion as real science 
is misunderstood -- except that the language breaks down here. If you’ve never 
heard of science (to say nothing of how it works) you can hardly be aware that 
you’re embracing pseudoscience. You’re simply thinking in one of the ways that 
humans always have.” 
“What skeptical thinking boils down to is the means to construct, and to 
understand, a reasoned argument and - especially important - to recognize a 
fallacious or fraudulent argument. The question is not whether we like the 
conclusion that emerges out of a train of reasoning, but whether the conclusion 
follows from the premise or starting point and whether that premise is true.” 
“Baloney, bamboozles, careless thinking, flimflam, and wishes disguised as facts 
are not restricted to parlor magic and ambiguous advice on matters of the heart. 
Unfortunately, they ripple through mainstream political, social, religious, and 
economic issues in every nation.”  
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4. The SET Research Program as a logical fallacy 
 
Here, we shall argue that the SET Research Program is predicated: (a) on a false 
analogy between the nature and substance of a business enterprise and those of a 
university, and therefore (b) on a mischaracterization of the true nature of the 
student-professor relationship. As such, we claim here that the SET Research 
Program is predicated on a logical fallacy.  
This false analogy, this logical fallacy, may be defined as this: (a) a university and 
a business firm are two organizational entities, (b) a business firm is successful if it 
is product-quality, customer, and bottom-line oriented, and (c) a university can be 
“successful” if it too becomes product-quality, customer, and bottom-line 
oriented.
11 
Remark 9: The use of this analogy is evident in the literature. For example, Nicklin 
(1995) stated, “The university is just another business organization, and ‘educating 
people is a process, just like making a car is a process’” (A34). Likewise, in his 
monograph on the use of management fads in higher education, Birnbaum (2000) 
wrote, “Most business leaders think that colleges and universities would become 
more efficient and more productive by adopting business practices” (p. 215). 
Finally, Carlin (1999) wrote, “I have been a businessman for over 35 years, and I 
was a trustee of the University of Massachusetts and chairman of the 
Massachusetts Board of Higher Education for a total of 12 years. I am, or have 
been, a director of eight public corporations, and was chief executive officer of a 
transit system with an annual budget of $1 billion. I have also founded four 
businesses, in separate fields, that were recognized by Inc. magazine for their rapid 
growth and success. I think I’ve learned something about management and 
controlling costs. Never have I observed anything as unfocused or mismanaged as 
higher education.”  
Remark 10: Claims that this analogy is patently false are also evident in the 
literature. For example, Olivares (2003) noted that, “the subjectivity in student 
ratings of teachers is illimitable. To think that students, who have no training in 
evaluation, are not content experts, and possess myriad idiosyncratic tendencies, 
would not be susceptible to errors in judgment is specious” (p. 237). Likewise, 
Birnbaum (2000) observed that businesses and universities are non-comparable. He 
notes that, “Businesses look the way they do because firms with this form have 
proven to be more successful than firms with alternative forms. Universities look 
the way they do for the same reason: their form has proven to be superbly suited to 
what they do” (p. 217). Finally, Felder and Brent (1999) offered four reasons on 
                                                 
11 This claim represents the core premise underlying the recommendation that institutions 
of higher education adopt the principles of Total Quality Management (TQM). For a 
detailed analysis and critique of this, see Birnbaum (2000), especially his Chapter 4. For 
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why the application of corporate model to tertiary education is inappropriate. They 
wrote: 
• “In industry, the true mission is relatively clear, and quality is relatively 
straightforward to define. In education, the true mission is complex and subject 
to endless debate, and quality is therefore almost impossible to define in an 
operationally useful manner.” (page 9) 
• “In industry, quality is relatively easy to assess. In education, even if a definition 
of quality can be formulated and agreed upon, devising a meaningful assessment 
process is a monumental task.” (page 9) 
• “In industry, the customer is relatively easy to identify and is always right, at 
least in principle. In education, those who might be identified as “customers” 
have contradictory needs and desires and may very well be completely wrong.” 
(page 10) 
• “In industry, a clear chain of command usually exists, on paper and in fact. In 
education, a chain of command might exist on paper, but it is in fact relatively 
amorphous and nothing at all like its industrial counterpart.” (page 10-11) 
Remark 11: This false analogy leads to a mischaracterization of the true nature of 
the professor-student relationship. While the true relationship is one of master-
apprentice or (better still) mentor-mentee, the false analogy leads to the 
misconceptualization of the “student as customer”. In this vein, Haskell (1997) 
noted that “.. the simple student-as-consumer metaphor is inappropriate. Thus the 
‘consumer’ of higher education is in fact a wide constituency of groups distributed 
in both space and time.   The metaphor of student as consumer is more 
appropriately replaced by the metaphor of student as worker or as apprentice.” 
Singh (2002) noted, the SET “reduces the student-teacher relationship to a 
customer-producer relationship, which sanctions each to profit at the expense of the 
other, whereas quality in education calls for a commitment both from students and 
teachers. To maintain quality in education, we need an approach that involves 
communicative action, an approach that brings back students and teachers as a 
community of scholars, where both sides recognise their commitment towards the 
process of inquiry” (p. 681). Singh (2002) also noted that, “.. a teacher-student 
relationship is gift relationship, and it is two-sided. In this relationship, both the 
students and teachers have their reciprocal rights and responsibilities towards the 
process of scholarly inquiry. If our classrooms and lecture theatres are meant to be 
places of such inquiry, then our students are meant to be authentic participants of 
academic community, whose rights cannot be premised on the customer 
metaphor” (p. 698). Additional insight into the ludicrous nature of the student-as-
customer metaphor can be found in Cheney et al. (1997), and in McMillan and 
Cheney (1996).  Economic Interferences  AE 
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Perhaps the most damning and damaging criticism of the student-as-customer 
metaphor is provided by Crumbley (1995), when he observed,  
“Steven M. Cahn, Provost and Vice-President at City University of New York, 
debunks this ludicrous consumer argument by pointing out that passengers on a 
airplane do not certify pilots, and patients do not certify physicians. ‘Those who 
suffer the consequences of professional malfea-sance do not typically possess the 
requisite knowledge to make informed judgments’ [Cahn, 1986, p. 37]. Imagine the 
chaos if we certified dentists, nurses, CPAs, lawyers, engineers, architects, air 
conditioning repair people, etc. with questionnaires from customers.” (p. 5) 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has pointed up the methodological inadequacy of the SET Research 
Program, by reference to three, interrelated arguments. The first argument is that 
the SET Research Program can never capture the wisdom of a crowd because it 
fails to meet Surowiecki’s preconditions for the existence and articulation of the 
wisdom of a crowd.  The second extends the first, by stating: (a) the SET Research 
Program fails to provide the methodological controls needed to differentiate cause 
from effect, or stated differently (b) the methodological underpinnings of the SET 
Research Program is the misapplication of a closed-system paradigm to an open 
social system. The final argument is that the SET Research Program is predicated 
on a false analogy between business and the university, and therefore on a 
mischaracterization of the student-professor relationship.  
These three arguments should and can be viewed now against an even wider 
backdrop. In particular, there are those who suggest that regardless of the 
methodological flaws outlined above, there must be a way out. For example, what 
if one was to adopt Stanley Fish’s (2005) recommendations for the redesign of the 
SET questionnaire? [For an overview to such questions, to Fish’s questions, see 
Table 3 below.] That is, what if “fairer” questions were adopted? What if the SET 
questions focused exclusively on the functionality versus the dysfunctionality of 
the relationship between students and their instructor? What if one begins with the 
premise that both students and their instructor have responsibilities as well as 
rights, and then designs a questionnaire that offers a reading on whether or not both 
parties have honored their respective responsibilities? Our view is that this 
redirection of effort may be all well and good, but there would still remain a fly in 
the ointment. And this is the no-small issue of the reliability of self-reported data 
offered by anonymous respondents, especially in a situation that is known not to be 
devoid of incentives to misreport [e.g., Maxwell and Lopus (1994), Schwarz 
(1999), Sproule (2000 and 2002), and Wright (2006),]. Enough said. 
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Questions related to the instructor’s pedagogical responsibility:  
• Were examinations and other graded materials returned on a timely basis?  
• Were students tested on materials covered in the course?  
• Was there sufficient feedback on tests and papers?  
• Were course materials well prepared?  
• Did the course unfold as promised in the catalog and syllabus?  
• Was the instructor accessible to students during office hours? 
• Did the instructor give lectures that facilitated note taking? 
 
Questions related to the student’s pedagogical responsibility:  
• Did you attend class regularly?  
• Did you read the assignments? 
•  Did you spend much time doing research for your final paper? 
 
A question which conflates student and teaching performance, and which implies 
that the latter is always responsible for the former.  
• Have you learned and understood the subject materials of this course?  
 
 
To sum up, we offer one last comment. To the hard-core advocates of the SET 
Research Program, we ask: address the issues raised in the above paragraphs in a 
manner that persuades and convinces the informed layperson, or admit that you 
cannot, and abandon this research program once and for all. Now since we hold 
that such persuasive and convincing arguments cannot be found, we therefore 
recommend that you swallow a bitter pill; that being, you admit that the 
architecture of your research program is incoherent, ill-conceived, and fatally 
flawed, and therefore it cannot, with any credulity, serve as a constructive guide to 
the administration and governance of a university. And finally, we ask that you 
admit that the unintended consequences of  your efforts not only include the Economic Interferences  AE 
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successful but wrong-headed institutionalization of pseudoscience, but also the 
successful but wrong-headed transformation of the pedagogical environment into 
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